Leaving the Shadow: A Configurational Approach to Explain Post-identification Outcomes of Shadow IT Systems by Fürstenau, Daniel et al.
RESEARCH PAPER
Leaving the Shadow: A Configurational Approach to Explain
Post-identification Outcomes of Shadow IT Systems
Daniel Fürstenau • Hannes Rothe • Matthias Sandner
Received: 11 May 2018 / Accepted: 14 February 2020 / Published online: 9 March 2020
 The Author(s) 2020
Abstract With the advent of end-user and cloud comput-
ing, business users can implement information systems for
work practices on their own – either from scratch or as
extensions to existing systems. The resulting information
systems, however, often remain hidden from managers and
official IT units, and are therefore called ‘‘shadow IT sys-
tems’’. When a shadow IT system is identified, the orga-
nization has to decide on the future of this system. The
study uses a configurational perspective to explain out-
comes of shadow IT system identification, as well as the
mechanisms and contextual conditions which bring them
about. For this purpose, 27 profiles of shadow IT systems
were compiled by conducting 35 interviews with respon-
dents from different positions and industries. The analysis
gives insight into six distinct context-mechanism-outcome
configurations explaining four outcomes that occur after
shadow IT system identification, namely phase-out,
replacement, continuing as IT-managed system, and con-
tinuing as business-managed system. These results con-
tribute to the shadow IT literature and, more broadly, IS
architecture and governance streams of the IS literature.
They inform IT managers when these weigh decision
options for identified shadow IT systems given different
contextual conditions.
Keywords Shadow IT  IT governance  Application
governance  Configurational method
1 Introduction
The literature on shadow IT has noted the importance of
shadow IT systems for organizations as well as the chal-
lenges and opportunities they pose (Behrens 2009; Haag
and Eckhardt 2017). A shadow IT system can be defined as
a hidden software system or an extension to a system that is
neither developed nor approved by an official IT depart-
ment or senior management (Fuerstenau and Rothe 2014).
Its hidden character extends to a lack of awareness of the
system in the organization, but also means that it was not
part of IT planning (Kopper et al. 2018).
On the one hand, shadow IT can help to overcome
deficits of central systems (Behrens 2009), to increase an
organization’s innovative power and speed of change
(Györy et al. 2012; Fuerstenau and Rothe 2014), as well as
to promote creativity and personal initiative. On the other
hand, shadow IT can increase security risks (Silic and Back
2014; Walterbusch et al. 2017), deteriorate a company’s
architectural quality (Fuerstenau and Rothe 2014),
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introduce redundancies and higher costs (Kopper 2017), as
well as undermine control possibilities for IT management
(Zimmermann et al. 2014) and violate companies’ com-
pliance rules (Panko 2006; Gozman and Willcocks 2015).
In the face of power dynamics (Furstenau et al. 2017),
interdepartmental conflicts (Walton and Dutton 1969), and
political games (Behrens 2009), effective and functional
governance plays a particularly important role in shadow
IT (Winkler and Brown 2014; Zimmermann et al. 2016).
Given the contradictory advantages and disadvantages of
shadow IT, discussions on its management have come to
the fore in recent years (Kopper et al. 2018).
However, the previous literature on shadow IT has lar-
gely taken the hidden character of shadow IT systems for
granted without sufficiently acknowledging that shadow IT
systems may start in a kind of ‘‘under-the-radar’’ mode
while later on a shadow IT system can become known to
more and more stakeholders which provides opportunities
to reorganize the governance of the system. Furthermore,
the literature has commonly implied that shadow IT sys-
tems are always to be brought to IT unit governance or be
replaced by a new IT-governed system after identification
and has ignored the possibility of alternative outcomes.
Moreover, the literature lacks insight into the different
paths that shadow IT systems can take after they have been
identified and the underlying reasons for the differences.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal the outcomes after
the identification of a shadow IT system and to give insight
into the mechanisms and contextual conditions which influ-
ence these outcomes. This is important because shadow IT
systems present veritable sources of organizational innova-
tion that should be better exploited than in the past (Behrens
2009; Köffer et al. 2015). In addition, knowledge of possible
and frequent outcomes is a prerequisite for establishing
processes for controlling them (Zimmermann et al.
2014, 2017). The management and control of shadow IT
systems is hardly possible without a grounded understanding
of the forces that make some outcomes more likely.
We analyzed profiles of 27 shadow IT systems extracted
from interviews with 35 shadow IT experts. Based on
coding the data and using a configurational perspective (cf.
El Sawy et al. 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013), we
could identify four outcomes occurring after a shadow IT
system was identified: phase-out, replacement, continuing
as IT-managed system, and continuing as business-man-
aged system. We were able to identify six configurations of
contextual conditions, mechanisms, and outcomes. In a
nutshell, the analysis shows the importance of social and
technical deficiency mechanisms that jointly determine
which shadow IT systems are not continued but phased-out
or replaced. We also shed light on the role of contextual
conditions for discerning IT and business management
such as scope of use, task relevance, strict IT policies, and
business-IT trust. Taken together, our study shows that
there is much greater variation in post-identification out-
comes, and it provides a configurational theory for why
different outcomes are realized. Such configurational
understanding is important where business-managed sys-
tems become more prevalent and the management of these
systems becomes more shared among various stakeholders.
2 Research Framework
To develop our research framework, we first review dif-
ferent outcomes after shadow IT systems are identified.
Based thereupon, we introduce a configurational perspec-
tive as a framework to capture which combinations of
contextual conditions and mechanisms lead to these out-
comes. Such a configurational approach is appropriate as
multiple configurations of contextual conditions and
mechanisms may contingently cause an outcome. Then, we
tap into the different contextual conditions and mecha-
nisms in detail. Finally, we summarize key outcomes,
contextual conditions, and mechanisms of our study.
2.1 Shadow IT Post-identification Outcomes
In this paper, we focus on shadow IT systems that are
hidden and later become identified. Haag and Eckhardt
(2017) have used the notion of ‘‘covertness’’ to describe
this hidden character. The term ‘‘covert’’ (versus ‘‘overt‘‘)
is to be understood as the degree to which key stakeholders
such as IT managers, line managers, or senior managers are
aware of a system and the degree to which it is included in
IT management processes (Kopper et al. 2018). Among
these processes are IT risk and security management, IT
portfolio management, IT service management, as well as
enterprise architecture management. Multiple occasions
can unmask a shadow IT system. Often these occasions are
related to an organizational restructuring, a major IT
transformation, or shortcomings in the system itself that
lead to dysfunctions in business activities and make
involvement of the IT unit necessary. However, the post-
identification outcomes and the contextual conditions and
mechanisms leading to these outcomes have so far received
little attention in the literature on shadow IT.
In the broader literature on information systems, Recker
(2016) identifies three generic strategies around informa-
tion systems that are relevant for our investigation and
present a valuable starting point to conceptualize post-
identification outcomes.
Phase-out refers to a situation in which an information
system is discontinued without a replacement system. Such
a situation of ceasing an existing information system may
occur when a system no longer contributes to
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organizational aims (Rezazade Mehrizi et al. 2019). This
could be due to a lack of functionalities or ended vendor
support (Furneaux and Wade 2011). It could also be due to
a reorganization that makes the supported work task
obsolete or a displacement of people in an organization.
Discontinuance has mostly been discussed in the context of
organizational legacy systems (Rezazade Mehrizi et al.
2019; Furneaux and Wade 2011). It has, however, also
been noted that shadow systems can be designed as tem-
porary work systems that cease to exist after some service
or product has been produced (Alter 2014).
Replacement refers to a situation in which a shadow IT
system is discontinued after identification with another
system replacing it. In this situation, users switch from one
system to another one (Bhattacherjee et al. 2018; Polites
and Karahanna 2012). As we are interested in outcomes
after shadow IT identification, the former system is a
shadow IT system and the latter system is possibly a new
system operated by the official IT units.
The third generic strategy is continuance (Recker 2016).
Continuance refers to a situation in which the same infor-
mation system is further used for the same task, which
should be specified in the context of our investigation by
the way in which a system is governed after identification.
Drawing on the literature on application governance
(Winkler and Brown 2013), Kopper et al. (2018) have
distinguished two forms in which overt information sys-
tems can be governed. These forms refer to the extent by
which the task responsibilities for a system remain in the
business unit that created the shadow IT system or if they
are taken over by the IT unit.
Continuing as IT-managed system describes a situation
in which a shadow IT system remains operational but the
main locus of control is transferred to the IT unit after the
identification of the system. This means that the shadow IT
system becomes an officially ‘‘IT-managed system’’ since
the most important tasks related to the system are relocated
to an IT unit (Kopper et al. 2018; Zimmermann et al.
2016).
Continuing as business-managed system refers to a sit-
uation in which a shadow IT system is continued after its
identification and the business unit where it originated
keeps the responsibility for it. As Kopper et al. (2018) note,
such a system is more appropriately called a ‘‘business-
managed system,’’ as its covert character is morphed into
an overt one. From a governance point of view, ‘‘business-
managed’’ means that the system is managed in the busi-
ness unit in alignment with the IT unit or in a split-re-
sponsibility model. Some reengineering may be necessary
to comply with the company’s IT policies. Figure 1 sum-
marizes the four described outcomes and underlying deci-
sions with respect to these outcomes.
2.2 Configurational Perspective
Understanding the complex causal influences that lead to
different outcomes after shadow IT system identification
requires a conceptual perspective that is powerful enough
to account for equifinality. Equifinality refers to a situation
where a system can reach the same outcome from different
initial conditions and by a variety of different paths (Fiss
2007). A configurational perspective offers such a frame-
work. It was introduced more broadly to the information
systems field by El Sawy et al. (2010), and used by scholars
such as Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013), Henningsson and
Kettinger (2016), and Park et al. (2017). Such a perspective
is particularly well suited to offer holistic and systemic
explanations for phenomena. One of the logistical advan-
tages of configurational methods is their ability to handle a
medium number of cases, which would still be too many
for individual case comparisons (Ragin 2014). Further-




















Fig. 1 Four post-identification
outcomes for shadow IT
systems
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situations in which no single condition can produce an
outcome but only the joint occurrence of multiple condi-
tions. The configurational perspective offers a vocabulary
to reason about these situations holistically using the con-
cepts of mechanism, context, outcome, and context-mech-
anism-outcome configuration (Pawson and Tilly 1997).
A mechanism is a causally relevant process that pro-
duces an outcome (Bygstad et al. 2016). In the absence of
the mechanism, the outcome will not occur. However, it
may be the case that a causal mechanism only unfolds its
driving force when it is combined with other mechanisms
or conditions. In this situation, a mechanism may be nec-
essary but is not sufficient for the outcome. As Hen-
ningsson and Kettinger (2016), we are interested in
deficiency mechanisms that can be actualized or not. In the
context of our study, we refer to a deficiency as a low-
quality feature of a system impacting future development
possibilities. Accordingly, if a deficiency cannot be
resolved, it can become a deficiency mechanism causally
driving the discontinuance of a shadow IT system.
The context presents further conditions for an outcome to
occur. Conditions can be absent or present and thereby
provide the environment to observe an outcome. In config-
urational analysis, there is no presumption about the level at
which contextual conditions are located. In the context of our
analysis, contextual conditions particularly describe the
organizational setup in which processes take place that lead
to discontinuing or continuing a shadow IT system.
Outcomes are the consequences of interest for a con-
figurational analysis. They are produced through the
interplay of mechanisms and contextual conditions. In this
paper, outcomes of interest refer to the observable conse-
quences after a shadow IT system is identified, namely
phase-out, replacement, continuance as IT-managed and
business-managed system.
Taken together, combinations of context-mechanisms-
outcome are called configurations. A configuration
describes a set of actualized or non-actualized conditions
and mechanisms causing an outcome to occur (El Sawy
et al. 2010). Such configurations present causal hypotheses,
which describe when an outcome is to occur. The result of
a configurational analysis is to be understood as a prelim-
inary conjecture to be supported or refuted by data.
2.3 Contextual Conditions
In this section, we introduce different contextual conditions
that contingently entail shadow IT system post-identifica-
tion outcomes.
Scope of Use Scope of use refers to the breadth with
which a system is used throughout an organization (Win-
kler and Brown 2013). Systems with larger scope may be
distributed across many users, departments, and locations.
They are used in many potentially critical routines. Dif-
ferent departments using a system can block each other and
make changes more difficult. Thus, a larger scope may
produce ‘‘gridlocks from an interplay of structural and
behavioral complexity’’ (Agarwal and Tiwana 2015,
p. 474). It is also plausible to suspect that systems with a
larger scope of use are more deeply technically and orga-
nizationally embedded (cf. Winkler and Benlian 2012). A
deeper technical embedding, in turn, implies that the sys-
tems are more difficult to discontinue, because many
dependencies to other systems must be considered (Fur-
neaux and Wade 2010, 2011). Furthermore, (dis-)invest-
ment decisions for more embedded systems are likely to
have an impact not only at departmental level but also at
wider organizational levels (Xue et al. 2008), making it
harder to reach a decision. A larger scope of use could
therefore represent a context in which identified shadow IT
systems rather tend to be continued than discontinued.
Task Relevance We refer to task relevance as the extent
to which a task supported by a system has a critical impact
on the organization (cf. Morris and Venkatesh 2010). If a
task is not relevant, it is likely to be an obsolete activity
that is no longer important for an organization. Therefore,
it is suspected that an information system supporting this
task will also be suspended (Recker 2016). In contrast,
shadow IT systems that support critical organizational
tasks may not be abandoned (Zimmermann et al. 2016).
Instead, such systems may be replaced by an IT-managed
system or reengineered if they are deficient (i.e., of low
quality) (ibid.). Therefore, task relevance represents an
important contextual condition that signals the demand of
the organization to support the task using an information
system.
Strict IT Policies By IT policies, we refer to the stan-
dards, rules, and guidelines for the use and security of IT.
Such rules can be either strict or relaxed with regard to the
development and use of shadow IT systems (Haag and
Eckhardt 2017). Relaxed IT policies represent a context in
which the unauthorized procurement and usage of shadow
IT systems is likely because low levels of restrictions exist
(Lüker et al. 2016). A setting with strict IT policies has
high levels of restrictions in place and in turn discourages
the usage of shadow IT systems (Haag and Eckhardt 2017).
IT policies may be an important context for shadow IT
post-identification outcomes, because organizations with
stricter policies may prefer to recentralize shadow IT sys-
tems after identification. In contrast, ‘‘laissez faire’’ orga-
nizations unofficially acknowledge policy-breaking as
necessary (Martin et al. 2013), and find business-managed
systems more acceptable (Gregory et al. 2018). Stricter
policies may also signify an already powerful IT
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department, which likes to extend its resource base by
centralizing previously decentral IT systems (George and
King 1991).
Business-IT Trust As another important contextual con-
dition, we consider the level of trust between business and
IT units. By business-IT trust, we refer to mutual respect
between both parties (business and IT) who interact
openly, benevolent, non-opportunistically and value each
other’s abilities (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998).
In contrast, a distrustful relationship is characterized by
opportunistic action that does not follow joint interest.
Trust is an important dimension of the partnership between
business and IT (Luftman 2003) and its social capital
component (Schlosser et al. 2015). A trust relationship
between business and IT units is likely to reduce the overall
amount of shadow IT systems, because less subversive and
hidden action is commensurate (Furstenau et al. 2017). A
trust relationship can be a prerequisite for cooperation that
enables its centralization (Wilkin and Chenhall 2010;
Nwankpa and Roumani 2014). It is thus a necessary con-
dition for a business to hand over the responsibility for a
cherished system to an IT unit. We suspect trust between
business and IT units plays a role in post-identification
outcomes of shadow IT systems.
2.4 Deficiency Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce two deficiency mechanisms
related to shadow IT post-identification outcomes: techni-
cal and social deficiencies. These mechanisms build on the
socio-technical nature of change in information systems
(Lyytinen and Newman 2008) and shadow IT systems as
well as on the logic of deficiency mechanisms as concep-
tualized in this paper as drivers of discontinuation
decisions.
Technological Deficiency Mechanism The first deficiency
mechanism we introduce is related to the technology
dimension of a shadow IT system. The technological
deficiency mechanism refers to structural issues arising
from an insufficient technological basis (system architec-
ture) or a lack of integration of the system in the overall
system landscape. There are several reasons for this, which
can accumulate over time. First, a system could be built on
a very narrow or simply outdated technical basis (e.g.,
server technology, operating system, database, code
library, or middleware). This may decrease an organiza-
tion’s intention to further develop or maintain a system
(Furneaux and Wade 2011). Alternatively, the system
could hit a technological cliff when certain technological
components need upgrades. For example, a system’s
technical basis may no longer be updated by the vendor and
self-development may be too costly. Further technological
challenges can relate to non-performant or complex inte-
gration (Huber et al. 2018). For example, uploading data to
other systems may be too complex and a simple fix may not
be in sight. When an insufficient access to official systems
is circumvented by greatly expanding the IT landscape
complexity, integration issues become more prevalent over
time (Fuerstenau and Rothe 2014; Koutsikouri et al. 2018).
Taken together, these examples show how technological
problems and dependencies over time can create pressure
that may lead to a negative outcome related to an identified
shadow IT system.
Social Deficiency Mechanism A second group of defi-
ciencies refers to the social dimension of a shadow IT
system. It is defined as structural issues with the actors
involved in deploying or managing a shadow IT system or
the tasks the system is applied to. Key actors include
employees and vendors as well as practices to mediate
between people such as system documentation and com-
munication. A deficiency mechanism related to key persons
can arise in the moment when a system becomes dependent
on a few people that later leave the company (Behrens
2009). This may happen when a key developer of a self-
developed system retires, while the entire process chains
have been built around the local system. Adequate docu-
mentation may not be available. However, even clear and
comprehensible documentation can only partially com-
pensate for the loss of key persons. Another set of issues in
the people-related realm arises with vendors, which can
become an important source of dependency and lock-in
(Greenstein 1997), and finally pose a threat for the survival
of a shadow IT system. First, there may be agency prob-
lems as when the vendor or consultant has an incentive to
delay a project to justify additional payments. Secondly, a
vendor might disappear before the end of the lifecycle of
the shadow IT system is reached; therefore, the further
development is not guaranteed. Furthermore, a vendor can
cease support for a product, as observed frequently with
self-developed systems depending on Excel/Visual Basic
(cf. Raden 2005). Altogether, social issues may form a
deficiency mechanism that increases dependencies between
individuals within and across organizational boundaries.
Another problem in the social realm relates to the
business tasks associated with a shadow IT system (cf. Aral
and Weill 2007). It includes a system’s ability to correctly
apply a business logic (Markus 1983). Faulty business
logic hidden in spreadsheet applications can be hard to
decipher in the progress of further development and at
some point led to poor decisions (Raden 2005). A system
should solve a task with appropriate quality, be usable by
the people entrusted with the task, and be expandable with
regard to the underlying data and functional structure if the
task requirements change (Panko 2006; Tarafdar et al.
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2015). In addition, the quality of the processes and support
structures surrounding a system can also be important
(Zimmermann et al. 2016). If such structures do not exist,
users can be disappointed and turn away from the system.
Taken together, task-related social deficiencies imply that a
system is currently or in future not in a position to fulfill
the needs associated to the tasks of its core audiences.
2.5 Summary
Table 1 summarizes contextual conditions, mechanisms,




The literature on shadow IT post-identification outcomes is
sparse and consists mostly of narrative accounts (Behrens
2009; Györy et al. 2012; Silic and Back 2014; Kopper and
Westner 2016). Because the cases in the literature often do
not provide the richness needed for a literature-based
qualitative comparative study (Henfridsson and Bygstad
2013; Henningsson and Kettinger 2016) and because we
wanted to derive empirically grounded causal hypotheses
for shadow IT post-identification outcomes, we conducted
interviews with experts. The interviews helped to get a
broad overview from respondents in different industries
and positions related to shadow IT systems. Following
Meuser and Nagel (2009), we use the term ‘‘expert’’ here in
a broad sense indicating that a person is knowledgeable
related to the subject area as a specific field of action.
We conducted 35 interviews with 29 participants in two
rounds. Interviews were appropriate for this study for three
reasons. First, the interviews allowed consolidating diverse
terminologies from different persons without degrading the
potential richness of meaning (Alvesson 2003). Second, the
interviews were relatively efficient to explore a broad
spectrum of systems, functions, industries, and roles
without being bound to the idiosyncrasies of one setting.
Third, the responses enabled us to collect the essence of a
system’s identification outcomes and its reasons into one or
a few interviews while maintaining the ability to reflect on
and inquire new factors.
Table 1 Research framework for configurational analysis
Grouping Concept Definition Possible values Key references
Contextual
conditions
Scope of use The breadth with which a system is
used throughout the organization
0 – Small scope
1 – Large scope
Winkler and Brown (2013),
Xue et al. (2008)
Task relevance The level of criticality of the task
supported by the system for the
organization
0 – Not relevant
1 – Relevant
Recker (2014),
Zimmermann et al. (2016)
Strict IT policies Level of IT policy enactment with




Haag and Eckhardt (2017),
Lüker et al. (2016)
Business-IT trust Level of partnership between business
and IT regarding an open, benevolent,
and mutually respectful relationship






Technical deficiency Structural issues with low quality of
the technological base or integrations
of a system
0 – Not actualized
1 – Actualized
Furneaux and Wade (2011),
Huber et al. (2018)
Social deficiency Structural issues with low quality of
skills of actors involved in, practices
managing, or with the character of the
tasks a system is applied to
0 – Not actualized
1 – Actualized
Aral and Weill (2007),
Zimmermann et al. (2016)
Outcome Phase-out System is discontinued without
replacement system




Replacement System is discontinued and users
switch to a replacement system
0 – No replacement
1 – replacement
Recker (2016), Rezazade
Mehrizi et al. (2019)
Continuing as
IT-managed system
System is continued and taken over by
IT unit
0 – Not IT-managed
1 – IT-managed
Winkler and Brown (2014),
Kopper et al. (2018)
Continuing as business-
managed system
System is continued and handled as
business-managed system
0 – Not business-managed
1 – Business-managed
Kopper et al. (2018)
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We first created a contact database (N = 118) from our
own industry experience and public sources and then
contacted potential interviewees. The contacts that agreed
to participate in our interviews (N = 35) came from diverse
industries and represented different roles. These included
business roles such as creators/developers, sponsors, and
users of shadow IT systems as well as IT management roles
such as IT managers, architects, security and governance
representatives, plus consultants being concerned with the
control, migration, or discontinuance of shadow IT sys-
tems. Table 2 summarizes our data sources.
The investigated systems stemmed from a diverse set of
organizations, whereby all organizations in question were
headquartered in Germany or Switzerland. Their size ran-
ged mostly from medium to large. Per default, we designed
our study so that one respondent told the story of one
shadow IT system case. Following the same interview
pattern, in six of the cases we could consult with multiple
respondents to back-up and triangulate the individual case.
We made sure that all interviewees had direct access to the
shadow IT system in scope to foster the credibility of their
statements (Madill et al. 2000). We confirmed this by
asking respondents for specific examples and events indi-
cating their involvement in the process of developing,
using, or overseeing the shadow IT system.
The interviews took place in a period between January
2015 and October 2016.1 They generally lasted between
45 min and 1 h and were performed either face-to-face, via
telephone, or via audio–video conferencing tools. We
recorded the interviews where the interviewee agreed with
Table 2 Data sources
System #Int. Interviewees Co. Industry Size Country
S1 BOARD 3(*) IT manager (P1), CIO (P2), IT developer (P3) A Utilities 7500 DE
S2 CRM 2(*) Developer (P4), outsour-cing partner (P5) B IT Services 100 DE
S3 CONTRACT 1(*) IT consultant (P6) C Insurance 30,000 DE
S4 CARGO 1(*) Developer (P7) D Transport [ 100,000 DE
S5 IT DB 1 IT consultant (P8) E IT Services 3000 DE
S6 MARKET DATA 3 Project manager (P9), IT architect (P10), IT security (P11) F Banking 4000 DE
S7 ALGO 2 Developer (2x) (P12, P13) F Banking 4000 DE
S8 FIXINGS 1 Developer (P14) F Banking 4000 DE
S9 HOT BILLING 1(*) Business manager (P15) G Telco [ 100,000 DE
S10 BILL-SWEEP 1(*) Business manager (P15) G Telco [ 100,000 DE
S11 IP-TEL 1(*) Business manager (P15) G Telco [ 100,000 DE
S12 BOOKING 1 Internal consultant (P16) H Transport [ 100,000 DE
S13 ASSET MGMT. 1 IT consultant (P17) I Production 5000 DE
S14 CUST. MGMT. 1(*) IT consultant (P18) J Banking 40,000 DE
S15 EQUIP 1(*) IT consultant (P19) K Technology [ 100,000 DE
S16 ADMIN 1 IT manager (P20) L Public Sector 750 DE
S17 AERO 2(*) IT consultant (2) (P19, P21) K Technology [ 100,000 DE
S18 FIN-CALC 1 Business manager (P22) M Banking 750 DE
S19 RECON 1 IT manager (P23) M Banking 90,000 DE
S20 DOC-2-DOC 1 IT consultant (P24) N Healthcare 16,000 DE
S21 FILE 1 IT manager (P25) O Technology [ 100,000 CH
S22 SETTLE 1 Architect (P26) P Insurance 14,000 DE
S23 UNDERWRITE 1 Architect (P26) P Insurance 14,000 DE
S24 SIM DISASTER 1 Architect (P26) P Insurance 14,000 DE
S25 PDM 1(*) IT consultant (P27) Q Production 1000 DE
S26 MUNICIPAL 1(*) Business user (P28) A Utilities 7500 DE
S27 CTRL COCKPIT 2(*) Business user (P29), IT manager (P1) A Utilities 7500 DE
Total 35 17 100–[ 100,000
In brackets (*): follow-up interview conducted
#Int… number of conducted interviews, Co… company assignment
1 Four additional interviews came from an earlier empirical study
that was conducted in 2012 in the waste management industry. These
interviews were included because they provided rich background
information on two of the shadow IT systems of the present study.
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the procedure (75% of the interviews). These interviews
were transcribed. For the other interviews, we produced
field notes within 48 h after the interview substituting for
the transcription. We asked interviewees for a follow-up as
well as for additional materials on the discussed system.
Whereas we obtained rich materials such as documenta-
tions and vendor presentations for some shadow IT sys-
tems, in most cases no written documentation was
available. If available, the materials informed our analysis
and helped to triangulate our results.
Against a critical realist epistemology (Bygstad et al.
2016) our interviews followed a narrative strategy that
considered concrete stories and the interviewee’s personal
experiences (Clandinin and Rosiek 2007). We did so by
focusing on specific cases that the interviewees perceived
as ‘‘critical’’ or ‘‘revelatory,’’ because we expected to learn
most from reflecting on these cases. We had prepared an
interview guide that tapped into three main areas: (1.) The
‘‘story’’ of one specific shadow IT system, the critical
challenges therein, and changes in the system’s operations
and/or governance, and (2.) more general observations
drawing on the interviewees broader experience with the
topic area and further cases. In addition, we (3.) asked for
descriptive facts (the interviewee’s industry experience, the
interviewee’s current position and role, and descriptive
information regarding the shadow IT system). We treated
the resulting data as ‘‘fixed,’’ seeking to identify patterns in
the data that would be independent of the specific context
(Clandinin and Rosiek 2007).
3.2 Case Database, Coding, and Configurational
Analysis
Our case analysis consisted of multiple rounds and itera-
tions. In a first round of summarizing and coding, we
created a detailed case tableau in which we described every
identified shadow IT system using one column. As some
interviewees provided rich accounts of multiple shadow IT
systems, while others did not provide sufficient information
on specific systems, the number of cases does not match the
number of interviewees.2 Our case tableau included data
such as a short description (ca. 50–100 words; see
Appendix 1, available online via http://link.springer.com),
background facts, reasons for the origination of the system,
growth patterns, incidents (challenges), observed out-
comes, and other context factors. In this first round, a
coding of incidents took place by author 1 and 3 using a
code set abductively derived from the literature and
emerging empirical insights. This means that inductively
emerging codes in the empirical material where tied back
to theoretical concepts from the literature, which were then
reapplied to the empirical material in an iterative fashion.
The coding followed a ‘‘consensus principle’’ to guarantee
agreement among coders (Harry et al. 2005, p. 6).
Based thereupon, this paper uses a configurational
perspective (cf. El Sawy et al. 2010; Henfridsson and
Bygstad 2013) to elucidate outcomes of shadow IT system
identification and underlying reasons. As applied here, our
configurational analysis distinguishes explanatory factors
into mechanisms and contextual conditions. We aggregated
previously derived codes for incidents into two deficiency
mechanisms (social and technical) and recoded the cases
for the presence or absence of the theorized contextual
conditions. A table was prepared that helped in comparing
similarities and differences across cases (see Appendix 2),
which was further condensed and abstracted from to derive
the results presented in the next sections.
4 Configurational Analysis
Our configurational approach identified six configurations
(1–6) that are associated with either of the four possible
post-identification outcomes of phase-out, replacement,
continuing as IT-managed system, and continuing as
business-managed system. Figure 2 displays the results.
4.1 Phase-Out
We refer to a phase-out as a situation in which an identified
shadow IT system was discontinued after its identification
without putting a new system in place. Three systems in our
sample matched the outcome combination of phase-out,
associated with one combination of conditions.
Configuration 1: Phasing-Out the Insignificant There
was one coherent context-mechanism-outcome configura-
tion for phase-out (3 cases), as well as one configuration
that was dropped because it had only limited support in our
data (1 case). For all cases, social and technical deficiencies
were actualized. At the same time, the contextual condi-
tions were identical. Phase-out occurred in a context in
which the system was small in scope, where a distrustful
relationship existed, relaxed IT policies were in place, and
the task was not particularly relevant to the organization.
The unconfirmed configuration differed in the contextual
conditions with strict IT policies in place.
One example was a board computer system in a recy-
cling firm (S1). The system supported the routing of trucks
using GPS data. It was introduced in one of the firm’s main
subsidiaries. Neither was a central system available nor had
the IT department the resources and showed the will to
develop a new system. The subsidiary hired a consultant
2 Respondent data which could not be assigned to specific cases was
used in the discussion only.
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who in turn was affiliated with a software development
company. However, various technical and social deficits
came to light. The technical platform (Windows CE) on
which the system relied had limited capacities and was
quickly outdated (technical deficiencies actualized). In
addition, the consultant had set an initial price that was too
low, which later turned out to be untenable. The contracted
software development company went bankrupt and the
system could not be implemented as planned (social defi-
ciencies actualized). Therefore, it was mounting technical
and social deficiencies that triggered discontinuance. This
happened in a context characterized by a distrustful rela-
tionship between IT and the local subsidiary (trust not
actualized). The IT unit considered only costs as important
and was not responsive. In consequence, the local sub-
sidiaries did not see them as a trustworthy business partner.
Moreover, the IT unit had not set strict policies for pre-
venting the external procurement (relaxed IT policies).
When the IT department was later involved, it was too late
and the system was already integrated into the trucks. A
new system was not introduced at this stage because the
task was not considered relevant enough (task relevance
not actualized). Moreover, the system’s small size in
relation to a large-scale ERP project on the horizon (small
scope) contributed to the decision to postpone investments
into a new system until the new ERP was rolled out.
The other examples confirmed that significant risk
combined with a non-critical task explain why some sha-
dow IT systems are discontinued without (immediate)
replacement.
4.2 Replacement
By replacement, we refer to the outcome of a discontinued
shadow IT system post-identification with a new system
replacing it. For 11 systems in our sample, replacement
was the observed outcome. We found two configurations
explaining this outcome combination: one configuration
marked by distrust (5 cases) and another by business-IT
trust (4 cases), as well as two more configurations that were
dropped as each had only limited support (1 case each).
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Fig. 2 Configurations of shadow IT systems pre-/post-identification. 1,2Number of excluded system per outcome due to requirement of at least
two identical cases per context-mechanism-outcome configuration (compare with Ragin 2014)
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they were large, as well as social deficiencies that could not
be observed in one case.
Configuration 2: Distrustful Replacement Similar to the
phase-out, we observed replacement to occur in situations
in which a small system faced social and technical defi-
ciencies in a context that lacks trust between business and
IT.
One example is an underwriting system in a reinsurance
company (S23). The system supported sales employees in
closing reinsurance contracts, especially in the process of
calculating damage ratios. When the company migrated to
another Excel version, the system was replaced by a new
system as part of a migration project. From a standpoint of
technical deficiencies, especially performance issues and
self-developed interfaces to a data warehouse/BI system
turned out to be problematic (technological deficiencies
actualized). At the same time, the system relied heavily on
knowledge from externally contracted consultants, creating
a critical dependency (social deficiencies actualized).
Tensions between IT and business units revealed a lack of
trust in the abilities of the IT unit. The IT unit was per-
ceived as not being able to fulfil the units’ demands in a
satisfactory manner and the business unit turned to external
consultants. This happened in a setting in which IT policies
were not enacted (relaxed IT policies). The system’s small
scope made replacement for the necessary task feasible
(small scope).
Other cases showed that a subversive business unit had
procured a system that later proved unsustainable due to its
social and technical deficiencies. Thus, the identification of
the system presented an event that made the replacement of
the system by a central one more likely. The identification
led to a ‘‘hostile takeover’’ after which a distrustful rela-
tionship remained, if it was not further enforced.
Configuration 3: Trustful Replacement Another mecha-
nism-context-outcome combination existed for replace-
ment in which business-IT trust was present. A case
example was an IT management database in an IT service
management firm (S5). The system, programmed by a
hands-on IT person, helped to automate IT portfolio
planning using a self-developed Access database. The
system was discontinued due to problems arising from the
inextensible, chaotic data structure and the single-person
dependency, which contributed to serious planning failures
or almost-failures using unreliable data from the system
(social and technological deficiencies actualized). How-
ever, the decision to replace the shadow IT system by a
new system was supported by the fact that the creator of the
system was not demonized but involved in the implemen-
tation of a new system (business-IT trust actualized). Thus,
the system creator could take ownership of the new system
and was consequently willing to contribute his domain-
specific knowledge.
Other cases confirmed that social and technical defi-
ciencies contributed jointly to the decision to not continue
the system, but that trust, and the involvement of main
shadow IT owners, helped in creating a new system.
4.3 Continuing as IT-Managed System
By continuing as IT-managed system, we refer to a situa-
tion in which the responsibility for a shadow IT system is
transferred to an IT unit after identification.
Configuration 4: Renewal in IT Mode This outcome was
brought about by one context-mechanism-outcome com-
bination (3 cases). The confirmed confi-guration was
characterized by the absence of deficiency mechanisms and
a context which was characterized by a large scope, a
relevant task, strict IT policies and a distrustful business-IT
relationship. A further configuration, differing in the
presence of technical deficiencies, was dropped due to
limited support in our data (1 case).
One example for renewal in IT mode is a market data
management system in a mid-sized bank (S6). The system
automated the delivery of external market data to internal
business units and thereby helped to be more competitive.
After the system was identified in the context of a reor-
ganization, it was decided to keep the system and to
transfer the responsibility to the IT unit (outcome: IT-
managed system). The absence of social and technical
deficiencies – enabled by the ‘‘good performance’’ (Project
manager, P9) (social and technological deficiencies not
actualized) of the project team who implemented the sys-
tem – contributed to the decision to continue the system.
The necessity of the system for the organization, indicated
by its large user base (large scope), contributed to the
decision to continue the system. The setting in which this
happened was generally distrustful with a great distance
between business and IT units (business-IT trust not actu-
alized). This means that no close exchange took place
between business and IT. Due to general risk considera-
tions and a restricted policy of recentralization of decen-
tralized systems (strict IT policies), it was decided to
transfer the system to IT governance.
The other examples confirmed that a large scope con-
tributed strongly to continuing a system in an IT-managed
mode. This was because the systems had already obtained a
critical status for the organization. Also, strict IT policies
presented a fertile ground for continuing a system in an IT-
managed way. Such policies favored choosing an IT
relaunch over business continuance. Finally, it was the
absence of major social and technological deficiencies
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which let IT units consider an IT relaunch as a viable
option.
4.4 Continued as Business-Managed System
We refer to continuing as business-managed system as a
situation in which a shadow IT system is continued and the
developing business unit keeps the control after the sys-
tem’s identification. The outcome was associated with two
configurations, which differed only in the extent to which
the continued system had a large scope (2 cases) or a small
scope (5 cases). One configuration was dropped since it had
only limited support in the data (1 case). The dropped
configuration differed in the presence of observable tech-
nical deficiencies. Across confi-gurations, a powerful
business unit maintained control post-identification against
a relatively weak IT.
Configuration 5: Continuing as Large Business-Managed
System One example for continuing a large business-
managed system was a customer management system in a
bank (S14). The system stored marketing data ‘‘wickedly’’
(IT consultant, P18). After the system was identified, it was
continued and the business unit kept control over the sys-
tem, although it was registered in the application portfolio
management (outcome: continuing as business-managed
system). The system was important for the business unit
(task relevance actualized) and it worked as intended (so-
cial and technological deficiencies not actualized). The
system served the entire marketing unit, and several
interfaces to other systems existed (large scope). Although
the IT unit wanted to gain more control, there were limited
information flows and the business unit did not want to
make its requirements transparent (business-IT trust not
actualized). The business unit blocked a change in gover-
nance and continued to develop the system with an external
consultant. According to IT consultant P18, the company’s
‘‘relatively timid’’ IT procurement policies (relaxed IT
policies) allowed business units to contract external IT
service providers relatively freely.
Configuration 6: Continuing as Small Business-Managed
System One example for this configuration was a disaster
management simulation in a reinsurance firm (S24). After
the system was identified, it was continued in the business
unit while being ‘‘on the radar’’ of the IT unit (outcome:
continuing a business-managed system). The conditions
under which the system evolved proved important for the
chosen governance. Since the IT unit was relatively weak
and lacked resources, the unit could not develop the nec-
essary knowledge and capabilities to maintain the system.
This inability was interpreted by the business unit as
lacking ability and is indicative for a distrustful relation-
ship (business-IT trust not actualized). Furthermore, the IT
policies of the company did not force the system to be
centralized (relaxed IT policies).
Overall, the examples confirmed that changes to the status
quo were not desirable because distrust existed between
business and IT unit, while social and technical challenges
did not pose an immediate threat that would have justified
discontinuance. Business rationales for continuing the sys-
tems as business-managed systems resulted from specialized
needs for knowledge existing only in the business units. The
trust-lacking relationship between business and IT and weak
IT unit power made the transfer in the cases in turn less likely
or excluded this option entirely.
5 Discussion
The paper aimed to reveal shadow IT post-identification
outcomes and to give insight into the underlying reasons
for when which outcome occurs. Taking a configurational
perspective, we identified six distinct configurations of
deficiency mechanisms under the presence of different
contextual factors explaining four outcome combinations:
phase-out, replacement, continuing as IT-managed system,
and continuing as business-managed system.
In general, it could be seen that phase-out and replace-
ment, representing outcomes in which the shadow IT sys-
tem was discontinued post-identification, were brought
about by a combination of social and technical deficiencies.
Continuing as business-managed system represented
another outcome, which was found in a constellation of
distant, disengaged, or overloaded IT units that did not
perceive urgency with regard to a functioning system.
Finally, continuing as IT-managed system represented a
special case of a committed IT unit – driven by strict IT
policies or requirements – taking over control over a sha-
dow IT system post-identification. In the following, the
deficiency mechanisms and contextual factors are analyzed
in detail.
5.1 Key Mechanisms and Contextual Conditions
One main insight of our study was the joint occurrence of
social and technical deficiencies for discontinued systems.
Illustrative for this finding was the Board Computer System
(S1) where architectural problems and a problematic ven-
dor relationship coincided. While it may be possible to
compensate for problems in one dimension by strong work
in the other, problems in both dimensions made the
investigated organizations act on the deficiency and dis-
continue the affected system. This finding is consistent
with Lyytinen and Newman’s (2008) conceptualization of
change in information systems as a socio-technical process.
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In this view, changes in one component of a system (e.g., a
technological break-down caused by excess input) may at
some point create a critical incident which, when combined
with further deficiencies such as key people leaving, makes
the problem pass a threshold where it can no longer be
accepted. This can then trigger further responses such as
the discontinuance of a system in order to re-establish the
stability of the entire work system. Based thereupon, it can
be reasoned that mounting social and technical problems
occurring simultaneously can lead to discontinuance
because the system poses too high risks or does not create
enough value for the organization.
Secondly, large scope and task relevance proved to be
important contextual conditions to understand post-identi-
fication outcomes. Large scope in many cases shows the
embeddedness of a system, Embeddedness is defined as the
extent to which a system is used in organizational pro-
cesses or is technically connected to many other systems
(Furneaux and Wade 2011). As Furneaux and Wade (2011)
found, embeddedness of a system represents an important
factor for discontinuance decisions. Usage in critical tasks
or many interfaces to other systems can represent impeding
factors creating continuance inertia. This is what our
analysis showed. Out of eight large systems, only two were
discontinued. One of the discontinued systems, a file-
sharing service (FILE: S21), was large in user base but low
in technical complexity and embeddedness in routines,
making the switch-over to a centralized system feasible.
Another large system, a customer relationship management
system (CRM: S2) could be replaced, because employees
had developed further Excel sheets complementing the
newly implemented replacement system, thus making
replacement less mentally and economically costly for
them. Our finding is also in line with Swanson and Dan’s
(2005) observation that system size (large scope) is posi-
tively related to a system’s remaining life expectancy.
Thirdly, we found that strict IT policies help to discern,
as a contextual factor, between continuing a system in a
business-managed versus IT-managed mode or discontin-
uing the system. In the configuration ‘‘renewal in IT
mode,’’ strict IT policies were observed together with
continuing a system in an IT-managed mode. This was the
case when the shadow IT system was generally of good
quality and critical for the organization. A strict IT policy
in such situation helped to enforce centralization. Another
pathway indicated that strict enterprise IT policy may
equally contribute to replacement. This was because strict
policies went together with strict assessment procedures
making those systems which could not be easily enhanced
(e.g., implementing secure login) the target of replacement.
This finding is generally in line with the literature on
compliant use of IT (Panko 2006; Hoffmann et al. 2015;
Lüker et al. 2016; Culnan 2019).
Finally, we found that trust between business and IT
units is necessary to accept a replacement system for an
identified shadow IT system. In configuration 3 (trustful
replacement), this was the case because the shadow IT
creators were directly involved or participated in devel-
oping or implementing a new system. Schlosser et al.
(2015) have shown that social alignment between business
and IT units can be fostered at the operational level by
increasing the degree of social capital between an organi-
zation’s business and IT units, IT personnel’s business
understanding, and a set of formal and informal IT gov-
ernance mechanisms. We found that a trust-lacking busi-
ness-IT relationship did in some constellations contribute
to a business department’s wish to maintain ownership
(configuration 5 & 6). There were, however, also cases
where a trust-lacking relationship and continuation as IT-
managed system were observed together (configuration 4)
due to risk and compliance considerations. Trust should be
considered as an important contextual condition that
deserves further attention.
5.2 Limitations
Before elaborating on theoretical implications, we will
mention several limitations of our study. First, we have
mostly relied on single respondents to reconstruct the
profiles of the systems. Their role or relationship to the
shadow IT system may affect their responses. We aimed at
consulting multiple sources of evidence where possible, but
future studies could equally involve each of these roles
(user, sponsor, developer, and IT control) for each system
to avoid potential biases. We were also not able to trian-
gulate some of the information from interviewees with
written documentation, because there was none available.
Business units often intentionally cover the design and use
of shadow IT systems. The lack of documentation is a
direct result. Hence, this limitation might only be resolved
through direct observation of development of such systems
in the future. An additional limitation of the study is that it
did not track the development of shadow IT systems over
time. The understanding of the life cycle of shadow is
limited to the perspective at one point of time (at which the
interview was conducted). Furthermore, only such shadow
IT systems could be considered which people were willing
to talk about. No systematic scanning was considered
feasible here. Moreover, we acknowledge the limited
number of cases per configuration, which calls for col-
lecting data on more cases. Finally, our focus on ‘‘systems’’
might have biased our view and future studies may devote
similar attention to other artifacts such as cloud services,
hardware devices, and technical tools (cf. Zainuddin 2012;
Silic and Back 2014; Matt 2018).
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5.3 Theoretical and Practical Implications
Our findings extend the shadow IT literature as well as the
architecture/governance streams of the IS literature. While
the existing literature has already considered challenges
related to shadow IT systems (e.g., Raden 2005; Panko
2006; Behrens 2009; Fuerstenau and Rothe 2014; Haag and
Eckhardt 2017; Haag et al. 2019), the literature lacks sys-
tematic analyzes of shadow IT post-identification out-
comes, considering the underlying mechanisms and
contextual conditions. We contribute to this literature by
suggesting a configurational theory of shadow IT post-
identification outcomes, which introduces deficiency
mechanisms and contextual factors that explain these out-
comes. Moreover, we regard our paper as a contribution to
future efforts for increasing the controllability over a sha-
dow IT system’s lifecycle. As the identification of a sha-
dow IT system can be followed by strong interventions
such as discontinuing a system, knowledge about mecha-
nisms and contextual factors may help to increase the
manageability of shadow IT systems as well as their
transfer from a ‘‘covert’’ to an ‘‘overt’’ mode in which they
are managed openly with oversight of the IT unit (Zim-
mermann et al. 2016, 2017; Haag and Eckhardt 2017;
Kopper et al. 2018).
For CIOs and IT managers it is important to be fully
aware of the different options on how to proceed when a
shadow IT system is identified. Our findings suggest that
systematic assessment of contextual factors as well as
social and technical deficiencies might offer good grounds
for IT managers to decide. Considering these factors is
increasingly important as demands on IT governance are
gradually changing with digitalization (Urbach et al. 2019).
Our research framework might inform standard procedures
for handling identification events in three ways. First, it
provides an overview of the different courses of action
which effectively leads to a more founded decision making.
Second, assessing social and technical deficiencies while
incorporating knowledge on the contextual conditions
provides a method to weigh potential risks against business
opportunities for potentially innovative systems. Our con-
figurational analysis implicates that low-quality systems
which showed both social and technical deficiencies were
regularly phased-out or replaced. For high-quality systems,
in turn, governance changes from business-managed to IT-
managed depended on the context, for instance whether
strict IT policies were in place. Through IT policies and
business-IT trust, companies can shape which identified
shadow IT systems are transferred to or replaced by central
IT systems profiting from valuable business insights. Third,
transparency of how to handle shadow IT systems further
legitimizes a decision and reduces unintended conse-
quences. Particularly, weakly legitimized phase-out or
(distrustful) replacement of a system might severely impact
existing business practices and individual motivations of
shadow IT system developers and users as well as (further)
harm business-IT trust.
5.4 Future Research Opportunities
In addition to confirming or revising our findings by means
of additional cases and conducting a large-scale study to
test our configurational hypotheses, we see four particu-
larly promising ways to proceed further. First, we took a
comparatively static perspective as we focus on one par-
ticular point of time in the life-cycle of a shadow IT sys-
tem, its identification and consequent outcomes. Future
work could make more explicit the temporal dynamics and
processes that link the identified mechanisms and other life
cycle transitions. In relation to that point, one could delve
deeper into particular cases and explore in more detail the
industry and other contextual conditions beyond the ones
analyzed in our study. Second, we found a trustful rela-
tionship between business units and IT units to be an
important contextual condition. The outcome of a shadow
IT system identification, however, has an impact on these
relationships, for instance, the phase-out of a cherished
system. The relationship between shadow IT systems and
trust may leave room to find self-reinforcing mechanisms.
Third, we considered governance-related outcomes after
identification as a consequence of IT policies in place.
Future work may also consider how a policy for using
shadow IT system is issued after the identification. Forth,
future work may aim at designing a theory-guided man-
agerial governance framework that supports the allocation
of task responsibilities for shadow IT systems between
business and IT units.
6 Conclusion
Shadow IT systems today pose many challenges and
opportunities for organizations that may become visible
when such systems are identified by management or the
official IT. We started our analysis from four theoretically
derived outcomes of these identification events, namely
phase-out, replacement, continuing as IT-managed system,
or continuing as business-managed system. We found that
technical and social deficiency mechanisms predominantly
determine discontinuance. At the same time, the contextual
conditions chiefly determine the chosen governance regime
for continued systems. The exploration of context-mecha-
nism-outcome configurations, thus, helps us to further
understand the effects of pulling shadow IT systems out of
the shadow. This research contributes to the shadow IT
literature while building upon IS literature on IT
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architecture and governance. The configurational approach
informs IT managers on how to weigh decision options
when identifying shadow IT systems.
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